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Abstract
We study experimental two-sided markets in which the information structure is endogenous.
When submitting an offer, a trader decides which other traders will be informed about the
offer. Thiss etup allowsboth a decentralized bargaining market (Chamberlin, J. Polit. Econ.
56 (1948) 95), and a double auction market (Smith J. Polit. Econ. 70 (1962) 111) ass pecial
cases. The results show that offers are typically directed to all traders of the other side of the
market, but to none of the tradersof the same side of the market. Even though traders receive
much less information, the resulting market institution leads to the same outcomes in terms of
pricesand efﬁciency asa double auction market. In two additional treatmentswe examine the
robustness of these results. First, it is found that the market institution adapts predictably, but
not necessarily efﬁciently, to the imposition of transaction costs. Second, we ﬁnd that the
preference of sellers to conceal offers from competitors is strict. At the same time, sellers
beneﬁt collectively when they reveal offersto each other.
r 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classiﬁcation: C9; D4; L1
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One of the main lessons of experimental economics is that market institutions
matter. The rulesthat govern trade may exert a profound effect on prices , efﬁciency
and the speed of convergence (Plott, 1982; Holt, 1995). In view of thisins ight
important questions are: Which market institution is likely to emerge endogenously?
Can we conﬁdent that an efﬁcient institution will emerge?
The function of market institutions is to match potential trading partners and to
provide them with the information needed to form contracts. Therefore, differences
in the information structure and the matching procedure can have a substantial
impact on the performance of markets. This is nicely illustrated by two seminal
experimental studies. Chamberlin (1948) studied a decentralized bargaining market
(DBM) in which traderscontacted each other one by one, exchanging offerson a
bilateral basis, with no other trader being informed of these offers or of realized
trades. This market was found to generate inefﬁcient outcomes inconsistent with the
competitive equilibrium. Smith (1962) studied a double auction market (DAM) in
which traders submitted offers on a multilateral basis, with all traders being
informed of these offers as well as of realized trades. This market was found to
converge quickly to the competitive equilibrium.
The present paper studies experimental markets in which the structure of the
information ﬂows is endogenous. When a trader submits an offer, she decides whom
to inform of the offer. She can decide to inform any subset of traders from both the
own side of the market and the other side of the market. If a trader is informed of an
offer from the other side of the market, she can form a contract by accepting the
offer. Only tradersthat are informed of the originating offer are informed of s uch a
contract. Note that if each trader alwayschoos esto inform every other trader of her
offer, the information and matching structure is identical to that of a DAM. If, at the
other extreme, each trader alwayschoos esto inform only one other trader of her
offer, the information and matching structure is in essence that of a DBM.
Furthermore, not only DAM and DBM are special cases of our setup. For example,
also an offer auction (only sellers make offers, all traders are informed), a bid
auction (only buyers make offers, all traders are informed), a posted offer auction
(sellers post take-it-or-leave offers, all traders are informed), and a posted bid
auction (buyers make take-it-or-leave offers, all traders are informed) are institutions
that could emerge in our design.
1
We ﬁrst investigate the endogenously emerging institution in a ‘pure’ environment
without exogenous frictions. The results indicate that offers are made by both sides
of the markets, and that offers from both buyers and sellers are typically revealed to
all potential trading partnersbut are concealed from rivals . Hence, tradersreceive
less information than in the DAM and more than in the DBM. Nonetheless, the
ARTICLE IN PRESS
1An interesting related experimental study is Campbell et al. (1991), where traderscould chos e to trade
at a double auction or by meansof bilateral bargaining. Campbell et al. (1991) however, did not allow for
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convergence.
To further investigate these results we employ two additional treatments. First, we
impose costs on the buyers for sending offers. The results indicate that sellers now
make most of the offers. These offers are again transmitted to all buyers but
concealed from other sellers. The emerging market is less efﬁcient than the DAM.
We conclude that transactions costs can indeed shape the emerging market
institution, but that there is no guarantee that this institution will lead to efﬁcient
outcomes.
Second, we further examine the preference to conceal offersfrom competitors . We
use a treatment in which every seller receives a small subsidy if he chooses to reveal
an offer to his rivals. The results indicate that a large fraction of the sellers still
chooses to conceal offers from rival sellers. Hence, the preference to conceal offers
from competitors is strict rather than weak. At the same time, the results indicate
that in those instances in which the sellers choose to reveal offers to each other prices
tend to be higher.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the features of
the experimental design common to all treatments. In Section 3 the endogenous
market without frictions is investigated. Section 4 discusses the treatment with
transaction costs imposed on buyers. Section 5 investigates the effect of a price




Each experimental market session consisted of a sequence of one practice round
and 18 trading rounds. Each trading round lasted 3 minutes. Markets were inhabited
by 12 traders, 6 buyers and 6 sellers. Traders retained their roles throughout the
session. In a trading round, each individual trader could trade at most one unit of a
homogenous good at no trading costs. The private value of a trader (cost value or
redemption value) changed from round to round. The set of values, however,
remained the same and this was common knowledge. Hence, the market
environment (i.e., the induced aggregate demand and supply function) was constant
across the practice round and the 18 rounds of the experiment. The cost and
redemption valueswere given in points , and 1 point exchanged for 0.3 Dutch
guilders(Hﬂ).
2
The demand and supply functions induced by these values are illustrated in Fig. 1.
Ascan be s een, the competitive equilibrium wasat a quantity of 4 unitsand a price in
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extra-marginal traders. The induced demand and supply schedule were, of course, to
a large extent arbitrary. Our main consideration was to strike a balance between the
probability of an extra-marginal trade occurring (a high probability requiring elastic
schedules), and the efﬁciency loss associated with an extra-marginal trade (a large
efﬁciency losses requiring inelastic schedules).
Besides values, traders were also assigned ID-letters: A, B, C, D, E, and F for
buyers, and U, V, W, X, Y, and Z for sellers. These ID-letters were randomly
(re)assigned to the traders at the beginning of each round. The assignment of ID-
letters was neither related to the assignment of values nor to the ‘‘real’’ identity of the
subjects. The subjects were informed about this.
2.2. Information display
The trading process was handled by means of networked computers. At any time a
trader’s computer screen displayed the following information: the round number, the
time left for trading, a trader’s role (buyer or seller) and ID-letter, the cost or resale
value, and a trader’stotal proﬁtsup to that round. In treatment with trans action
costs, the costs a buyer had already incurred during the round at hand was also
displayed on the screen.
In the middle of the display were the lists of ask- and bid prices, one above the
other. These lists only contained those offers that the trader was informed about.
Both ask- and bid prices were ordered from high to low, and for each offer also the
ID-letter of the sender was indicated.
Finally, at the bottom of the screen, there was a row with the prices of those
accepted offersthat the trader had been informed about. Only priceswere revealed













0 1 2  3  4  5  6 
quantity
Fig. 1. The induced demand and supply schedule.
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For each treatment,
3 four independent experimental sessions were run. Students at
Tilburg University were recruited as subjects through announcement in the
university bulletin and in classes. Participants were solicited for a two hours
decision-making experiment which would earn them money. Fifteen subjects were
registered for each experimental session to allow for no-shows. In session DAM1,
however, only 10 subjects showed up. This session was run with 10 traders, using the
design of Fig. 1 with one buyer (redemption value 50) and one seller (cost value 15)
excluded, leaving the range of equilibrium pricesunchanged.
Upon arrival in the lab, subjects drew an envelope with a seat number. If more
than 12 subjects showed up, one to three empty envelopes were added to the stack of
seat numbers. The subjects drawing an empty envelope received 10Hfl for showing
up and left the room. Once the remaining subjects were seated, the instructions for
the experiment were distributed and read aloud by the experimenter. Then the
subjects were given some minutes to study the instructions at their own pace, and to
privately ask questions. After the practice round, the 18 rounds which determined
subjects’ earnings were run. After round 18 the subjects privately received their total
earnings and left the room. Sessions lasted about one and a half hours. Earnings
were on average about Hﬂ 49, and ranged between Hﬂ 21 and 65.
3. The market without frictions
In this section, we investigate the market institution that emerges endogenously
when the traders decide about the direction of their offers. To assess the properties of
this institution we compare it to investigate three different treatments.
3.1. Trading institutions
Treatment 1: directed bid–ask market (DBAM)
Buyers could try to buy by making bids, and sellers could try to sell by making
asks. When making an offer (an ask or a bid), a trader had to enter a price at which
she was prepared to trade. She also had to enter the IDs of those traders she wanted
to inform about the offer. We call this treatment DBAM. This expresses that bids
and asks were ‘directed’ (to one trader, to all traders, or to any number of traders in
between) and that DAM and DBM are special cases. A trader was forced to enter the
ID of at least one trader from the other market side, i.e. the ID of at least one
potential trading partner. Thiscons traint wasimpos ed to prevent tradersfrom
sending ‘fake’ offers to only their own market side, i.e. to only their competitors.
Furthermore, offersthat could lead to negative proﬁtswere not permitted.
Offers could be adjusted at any moment by simply submitting a new offer.
The new offer did not have to be an offer that isbetter for the other market
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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4 With the new offer the old one became invalid. Hence, each trader had at most
one outstanding offer. Since everyone could trade at most one unit, a trader who had
already made a transaction could no longer make offers.
Aslong asa trader had not traded in that round, s he wasallowed to accept any
offer of a potential trading partner about which she was informed. Again we
enforced the restriction that an offer could only be accepted if it led to a non-
negative proﬁt. We did, however, not enforce the rule that a trader alwayshad to
accept the bes t price offered. When an offer wasaccepted, it waswithdrawn from the
market, and those traders who had been informed about the offer were also
informed that a transaction had occurred at that price.
Treatment 2: double auction market (DAM)
In the DAM treatment, tradersdid not have to enter any trader ID-letterswhen
submitting an offer. All offers were automatically sent to all other traders, i.e. to all
potential trading partnersaswell asto all competitors . All traderswere als o
informed when and at what price a trade occurred. Thistreatment boiled down to
the standard continuous DAM with the exception that trader IDs were added and
that traders were restricted neither to make an improving offer nor to accept the best
available offer.
Treatment 3: decentralized bargaining market (DBM)
In the DBM treatment, tradershad to enter one and only one ID-letter of a
potential trading partner when they entered an offer. Furthermore, when a
transaction occurred, only the two parties involved were informed. As in the other
treatments, traders were restricted neither to make an improving offer nor to accept
the best available offer.
An overview of the treatmentsinves tigated in thispaper isgiven by Table 1. The
last two treatments (DBAM-TC and DBAM-PC) will be explained in detail in
Sections4 and 5. The middle column of Table 1 describes whether a treatment is
characterized by an exogenousor an endogenousmarket ins titution and what its
main features are. The third column describes the type of friction used in each
treatment.
3.2. Expected results
To describe the (expected) results it is useful to introduce the following two
variables. Dclient refers to the ‘dissemination of an offer among clients’, and is deﬁned
asthe fraction of potential trading partnersinformed about an offer. Dcomp refersto
the ‘dissemination of an offer among competitors’ and is deﬁned as the fraction of
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offer. These two variables capture the deﬁning features of the different trading
mechanisms. For example, in a DAM we have Dclient ¼ 1a n dDcomp ¼ 1 for all
offers. All traders are informed about all asks and bids. In a DBM we have Dclient ¼
1=6 and Dcomp ¼ 0 for all offers. An offer is sent to one trader on the other market
side, and no other trader is informed about it. In the endogenous market treatment
the two variableswere endogenousand determined by the tradersthems elves .
For reasons of symmetry, we did not expect to ﬁnd any difference between the
demand and the supply side of the market in the DBAM treatment. That is, we
expected that the numbers of asks and bids were the same, and that DclientðasksÞ¼
DclientðbidsÞ and DcompðaskÞ¼DcompðbidsÞ. Moreover, there did not seem to be a
compelling reason for traders to send an offer to only a subset of the potential
trading partners. Sending an offer to all potential trading partners could only
increase the probability of acceptance. Furthermore, offers that were not yet
accepted could alwaysbe adjus ted in any direction. Since each trader could trade at
most one unit in our design, arguments for price discrimination do not apply. Hence,
we expected subjects to transmit their offers to every potential trading partner:
Dclient ¼ 1. However, it wasnot a priori clear what to expect regarding the
information to competitors. On the one hand, traders may want to conceal an offer
from competitors ðDcomp ¼ 0Þ in order to prevent or delay being overbid
(respectively, undercut) by competitors. The resulting institution would then be




Treatment Type of institution Type of friction
Double Auction Market (DAM) Exogenous: all buyers and





Exogenous: only one buyer
(seller) is informed of an ask
(bid)
No frictions









Transaction costs for buyers
no transaction costs for
sellers





Transaction costs for buyers
price communication subsidy
for sellers
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referred to as a ‘sealed offer double auction’, expressing the fact that offers are send
by both sides of the market like in the double auction, but that offers are concealed
from rivals. On the other hand, traders may choose to inform rivals about their
offers in an attempt at collusion. When competitors know each others’ offers, secret
rebatesare excluded. The incentive to outbid or undercut may be reduced when
rivalscan perfectly obs erve and follow them. After all, ‘‘the policing of a price
agreement involvesan audit of the trans action prices ’’ (Stigler, 1964, p. 47). If
competitorsdecide to inform each other about offers ðDcomp ¼ 1Þ then, together with
Dclient ¼ 1, the resulting institution would be equivalent to a DAM.
What did we expect regarding pricesand efﬁciency? Asin numerousother DAM
experiments, we expected prices and quantities in our DAM treatment to converge
quickly to the market clearing level with outcomesclos e to full efﬁciency.
5 For the
DBM treatment, on the other hand, we expected a slower convergence of prices and
quantitiesand lower efﬁciency levels .
For the DBAM treatment, we expected the outcomesto be conditional on the
results regarding Dcomp. If the directed bid–ask market would lead to an institution
that isequivalent to a double auction market, we expected prices , efﬁciency, and
convergence to be in line with the double auction market treatment. If, on the other
hand, a sealed offer double auction market would emerge then it is more difﬁcult to
predict its outcomes. Such a market has never been investigated before. Nevertheless,
some clear hints are provided by several bounded rationality models that are
developed to explain convergence of pricesand quantitiesin DAMs( Easley and
Ledyard, 1993; Friedman, 1991; Gode and Sunder, 1997; Gjerstad and Dickhaut,
1995). In these models traders respond adaptively to observations of offers of
competitorsand potential trading partnersand realized trans actionsprices .
Furthermore, in these models the speed of convergence depends positively on (the
number of) these observations. In a sealed offer, DAM traders would typically
observe only half of the offers and realized prices, whereas these data are public
information in the DAM. Hence, a reasonable expectation would be that
convergence of pricesand quantitiesto the market clearing level iss lower in the
sealed offer double auction market than in the DAM, but still faster than in the
DBM.
3.3. Results
First we examine which market institution actually emerged in the directed
bid–ask market with no frictions (Result 1). Then we compare prices (Result 2) and
efﬁciency levels (Result 3) across the three different treatments (DBAM, DAM and
DBM).
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not enforce an offer improvement rule. While thisrule isimportant for convergence of double auction
trades using simulated agents (see Gode and Sunder, 1997), we did expect the results of the double auction
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treatment is best described as a sealed offer double auction market. Offers were
typically sent to every potential trading partner but to no competitor.
In order to present the evidence for Result 1 we calculated for each offer the value
of Dclient, that is, the number of potential trading partners to whom the offer was
sent, divided by the maximum number to whom it could have been sent (i.e. divided
by 6).
6 Notice that Dclient ranged between 1/6 and 1 since each offer had to be sent to
at least one potential trading partner. Similarly, we computed Dcomp for each offer,
that is, the number of competitors who were informed about the offer divided by the
maximum number who could have been informed (i.e. divided by 5). Of course,
Dcomp ranged between 0 and 1.
Table 2 presents mean and median values for both Dclient and Dcomp for each of the
four DBAM sessions separately and averaged over all rounds. Also the percentage of
offerswith Dclient ¼ 1a n dDcomp ¼ 0 isindicated. The table s howsthat an offer was
sent to 85% of the potential trading partners on average, with 100% being the
median value. Furthermore, 77% of all offerswere s ent to every potential trading
partner ðDclient ¼ 1Þ. A look at the session data indicates that this pattern was
representative also for the individual sessions. Even in DBAM1, where average
Dclient waslowes t, an offer applied to all potential trading partnersin more than half
of the cases.
The dissemination of offers among competitors provided a completely different
pattern. On average, only 12% of the competitorswere informed about an offer, and
the median value iszero. In 85% of all cas esnot one competitor wasinformed. It is
evident that subjects were very reluctant to share information about their offers with
their competitors.
A similar picture arises if one looks at the dissemination of asks and bids
separately. Fig. 2 shows the relative frequencies of the different levels of Dclient and
Dcomp. In most cases an ask applied to all buyers and no other seller was informed
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 2
Dissemination of offers among clients ðDclientÞ and competitors ðDcompÞ
Session Average Median % offers with Average Median % offers with
Dclient Dclient Dclient ¼ 1 Dcomp Dcomp Dcomp ¼ 0
DBAM1 0.69 1 55 0.05 0 93
DBAM2 0.92 1 87 0.09 0 89
DBAM3 0.94 1 88 0.10 0 87
DBAM4 0.87 1 82 0.24 0 74
All sessions 0.85 1 77 0.12 0 85
6Note that this measure underestimates the actual the dissemination of an offer among potential clients,
since sometimes traders knew that some potential trading partners had already left the market.
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informed about it.
This pattern was stable over the time, as can be seen in Fig. 3 that displays the
development of average Dclient and Dcomp over the 18 rounds. From the very
beginning of a session, subjects typically made offers to all potential trading partners
and did not inform competitors, and this behavior did not change much over time.
We also checked for the development of Dclient and Dcomp within the rounds. We
found no distinctive differences between the beginning and the end of a round.
Result 2. Prices. Prices in the DBAM-treatment were as close to the equilibrium price
as those in the DAM-treatment and closer to the equilibrium price than those in the
DBM-treatment.
Remember that in our design the equilibrium price was set-valued (see Fig. 1).
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Fig. 2. Relative frequencies of dissemination of bids and asks among potential trading partners (Dclient)
and competitors( Dcomp) in the DBAM treatment.
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average distance to the equilibrium price that is not signiﬁcantly different from the
double auction market ðp ¼ 0:68Þ.
7 On the other hand, the distance to the
equilibrium price waslarger in the DBM-treatment (1.59) than in the DBAM-
treatment.
Ascan be s een in Table 3, even prices in session DBAM4 (the DBAM-session with
the largest distance between actual and equilibrium prices) were closer to equilibrium
than prices in DBM2 (the DBM-session with the lowest distance to equilibrium).
Hence, the difference between DBAM and DBM washighly s igniﬁcant ðp ¼ 0:028Þ.
One purpose of market institutions is to provide a matching and information
structure that allows the traders to reap the gains of trade. Did the endogenously
emerging market institution serve that purpose? We investigated the gains of trade
not reaped by the traders, i.e., the extent to which the sum of consumer and producer
surplus fell short of the maximum level. One measure of inefﬁciency is the foregone








1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17
round
D(client) D(comp)
Fig. 3. Development of average Dclient and Dcomp in the DBAM-treatment.
Table 3
Average absolute difference between actual prices and equilibrium price range
Session # DAM DBAM DBM
1 0.57 0.54 2.04
2 1.72 0.88 1.26
3 1.49 0.67 1.76
4 0.61 1.08 1.31
All sessions 1.1 0.79 1.59
7Throughout we employed two-tailed Mann–Whitney tests with session averages as observations.
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surplus was larger than zero.
Result 3. Efﬁciency.
ðaÞ The foregone surplus in the DBAM-treatment was as low as in the DAM-
treatment.
ðbÞ The foregone surplus in the DBAM-treatment was signiﬁcantly lower than in the
DBM-treatment.
For each of the three treatments, Table 4 presents the average levels of foregone
surplus and the number of inefﬁcient rounds.
The average inefﬁciency levels in the DBAM and the DAM sessions were about
1% and in the DBM sessions it was about 7%.
8 (see Table 4). The sealed offer
double auction market that endogenously emerged in the DBAM-treatment was
about as efﬁcient as the DAM. The efﬁciency levels of the individual sessions of the
two treatmentsoverlapped and the difference between the treatmentswasnot
signiﬁcant ðp ¼ 0:68Þ. This shows that an endogenous market institution can be as
efﬁcient as the DAM. The least efﬁcient institution was the DBM. Even the most
efﬁcient DBM-session (DBM4) was less efﬁcient than the least efﬁcient DBAM-
session (DBAM1). Again, the difference between the DBAM and the DBM-
treatment washighly s igniﬁcant ðp ¼ 0:028Þ.
Qualitatively the same results appeared when we looked at the number of
inefﬁcient rounds(Table 4). In the DBAM (DAM) treatment only 9 (11) of 72
periodswere inefﬁcient. In the DBM in more than half of the roundsnot all gainsof
trade were reaped (41 inefﬁcient roundsout of 72). Again the difference between
DBAM and DBM wass igniﬁcant ðp ¼ 0:028Þ, whereasthe difference between DAM
and DBAM wasnot ðp40:5Þ.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 4
Average levelsof (a) foregone s urplusand (b) the number of inefﬁcient rounds
Session # DAM DBAM DBM
(a)1 1.48 1.77 6.31
2 0.25 0 7.83
3 1.26 1.26 9.34
4 1.77 0.76 5.30
All sessions 1.19 0.95 7.20
(b)1 3 3 13
21 0 1 1
33 4 1 1
44 2 6
All sessions 11 9 41
8The impact of a trade of an extra-marginal trader aswell asthat of a non-trade of an intra-marginal
trader on efﬁciency depends of course on the supply and demand conditions. Hence, not the absolute
valuesof foregone s urplusbut the differencesin efﬁciency between the treatmentsare important.
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two different typesof inefﬁciencies . A round isinefﬁcient whenever an extramarginal
buyer or seller trades. Such inefﬁcient trades can only occur at out-of-equilibrium
prices. But even in the absence of inefﬁcient trades, a round may be inefﬁcient if not
all intramarginal traderss trike a deal. Such an inefﬁcient nontrade can occur if
potential trading partnersdo not ﬁnd each other or if they cannot agree on the price.
It turned out that the inefﬁciencies during the early rounds of a session were due to
inefﬁcient tradesaswell asinefﬁcient non-trades . If a later round wasinefﬁcient,
however, this was almost always due to inefﬁcient non-trades. This pattern emerged
in all three treatments. Both types of inefﬁciencies, however, were much more
frequent in the DBM than in the DBAM- and the DAM-treatment.
4. Transaction costs
In the previous section we studied the market institution that emerges when there
are no exogenous frictions. In this section we study the effect of exogenous
transaction costs. In particular, we examine how the market institution adapts to the
introduction of buyer communication costs. For an overview of the treatments see
Table 1.
4.1. Treatment 4: Directed bid–ask market with transaction costs (BDAM–TC)
The market technology wasasin the directed bid–as k market. Whenever traders
made an offer they decided to which potential trading partnersand to which
competitors the offer should be directed. Sellers could still submit asks at no cost.
However, submitting bids to the market was now costly for the buyers. For each
submitted bid, a buyer incurred a cost of 0.25 points for every trader (buyer or seller)
he chose to inform of the offer.
In this treatment we expected buyers to be less active by making both less bids and
possibly also broadcasting those bids less widely. Therefore, the emerging institution
should be rather one-sided with sellers doing most of the active offering, while buyers
mainly rely on waiting and accepting offers (which is costless to them). Given that
traders chose not inform competitors in the DBAM-treatment, we expected sellers to
exhibit the same behavior in the BDAM-TC treatment.
9 Together these choices
imply that there would be very little information to the active market side, the sellers.
This may lead to inefﬁciencies. There exists, however, an institution that is as
efﬁcient as the double auction market, and entails no transaction costs: the offer
auction (Walker and Williams, 1988). In an offer auction only sellers submit offers
(asks). These asks apply to all buyers and every trader is informed of all asks and all
transaction prices. To achieve this institution, sellers would have to inform each
other about the offers they make, that is, to communicate their prices.
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Result 4. Market institution. The institution emerging in the DBAM-TC treatment is
best described as a sealed offer auction. Most of the offers (asks) were made by sellers,
and these offers were sent to every buyer but concealed from competitors.
The numbers of asks and bids in the DBAM-TC treatment provide ﬁrst evidence
for Result 4. Whereas the introduction of the one-sided transaction costs left the
average number of asks per round unchanged, it decreased the average number of
bidsfrom 15.7 to 8.6 (s ee Table 5).
The effect of transaction costs on the dissemination of bids among sellers was even
more dramatic than the effect on the number of bids. While in the DBAM treatment
the average Dclient of bidswas0.858, it dropped to a level of 0.384 in the DBAM-TC
treatment (see Table 6).
The dissemination of asks did not change with the introduction of the transaction
costs. Average Dclient in the DBAM-TC treatment was0.853, whereasin DBAM it
was 0.865—typically asks applied to essentially all buyers (see Table 6). When we
combined the effect of the decrease in the number of bids with the effect of the lower
dissemination of bids, we found that the average number of bids a seller received per
round dropped from 13.4 in the DBAM to 3.3 in the DBAM-TC treatment. On the
other hand, the average number of asks a buyer receives per round did not change
(14.3 in the DBAM, 15.1 in the DBAM-TC treatment), and wasabout 5 timesas
large asthe number of bidsa s eller received in the DBAM-TC treatment. Hence, we
can conclude that the introduction of one-sided transaction costs induced the
emergence of an institution in which offers (asks) were made by the sellers, but not
by the buyers. Furthermore, the behavior of traders was quite stable across periods.
The average number of bidsin the DBAM-TC treatment declined s lightly during the
course of the experiment, indicating that with experience the buyers were somewhat
less willing to make bids.
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Table 5
Average number of offersper round
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ðDcompÞ wasvery low in the DBAM-TC treatment (s ee Table 6). Hence, in both
treatments offers were kept secret from the competitors.
Result 4 supports the idea that transaction costs are capable of shaping the
behavior of market participants and the resulting market institution. The
introduction of one-sided transaction costs led to a sharp decrease of costly bids,
and the few remaining bids were less widely disseminated.
What is the information structure of the emerging market institution? In a ‘pure’
sealed offer auction, only asks are made and competing sellers are never informed.
As a consequence, every seller knows only his own asks and his own realized trades.
A seller would have even less information than in the DBM, where he sometimes
observes bids of buyers. Of course, in the DBAM-TC sessions the emerging sealed
offer auction was ‘impure’, i.e. some bids were made and some asks were transmitted
to other sellers. In the DBAM-TC treatment an average seller was informed about
19.8% of the offersmade by others , and about 10.8% of the acceptancesof offers
made by others. In comparison, in the DBAM treatment an average seller was
informed about 51.5% of the offersmade by others , and about 50.2% of the
acceptances of offers made by others. By design, in the DBM treatment these
numbersare 9% and 0%, and in the DAM both numbersare 100%. Furthermore, if
we look at the development over the periods, we observe no trend towards more
information provision for sellers. The percentage of offers a seller is informed of even
decreases slightly as buyers learn to avoid transaction costs by entering fewer bids.
Next we investigate efﬁciency properties.
10 We have already seen that buyers do
incur some transaction costs. We now investigate the efﬁciency of the transactions
(gains from trade), not taking into account the wasteful transaction costs.
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Table 6
Average valuesof Dclient and Dcomp
Offer Session Dclient Dclient Dcomp Dcomp
DBAM DBAM-TC DBAM DBAM-TC
Bids1 0.782 0.337 0.099 0.009
2 0.875 0.411 0.080 0.039
3 0.955 0.423 0.091 0.016
4 0.820 0.366 0.203 0.004
Average 0.858 0.384 0.118 0.017
Asks 1 0.627 0.838 0.023 0.117
2 0.965 0.810 0.101 0.042
3 0.923 0.880 0.090 0.074
4 0.945 0.884 0.288 0.122
Average 0.865 0.853 0.125 0.089
10There were no signiﬁcant differences between the DBAM-TC treatment and the DBAM treatment
with respect to the difference between actual prices and the equilibrium price range.
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higher in the DBAM-TC treatment than in the DBAM treatment and the DAM.
However, the foregone surplus was signiﬁcantly lower than in the DBM.
The average inefﬁciency level wasabout 3% in the DBAM-TC treatment as
compared to 1% in the DAM and DBAM treatmentsand 7% in the DBM treatment
(see Table 7a). Even the most efﬁcient DBAM-TC sessions (DBAM-TC2 and
DBAM-TC4) were less efﬁcient than the least efﬁcient DBAM (DBAM1) and DAM
(DAM4) sessions. The difference between DBAM-TC and these two other
treatmentswashighly s igniﬁcant ðp ¼ 0:028Þ. However, the least efﬁcient DBAM-
TC session (DBAM-TC3) was more efﬁcient than the most efﬁcient DBM session
(DBM4), and efﬁciency differenceswere s igniﬁcant at ðp ¼ 0:028Þ.
A similar result holds when we consider the number of inefﬁcient rounds
(Table 7b). These inefﬁciencies can be caused by inefﬁcient trades (at out of
equilibrium prices) or by inefﬁcient non-trades. Both types occur in early rounds,
whereas in later rounds inefﬁciencies are mostly caused by inefﬁcient non-trades.
5. The effects of price communication
So far the emerging marketsin our experimentss hare the feature that traders
conceal offers from their competitors. When, as in the sealed offer double auction
market, both sides of the market were active the institution nevertheless led to high
levelsof efﬁciency. However, when only one s ide of the market wasactive, asin the
sealed offer auction, the resulting institution was inefﬁcient. Furthermore, the
efﬁciency of offer auctions suggests that this preference of traders to conceal offers is
the culprit for the observed inefﬁciency.
To test for the robustness of this preference for concealing offers, and to examine
the effectsof price communication between competitorson market outcomes , our
last treatment provides traders with explicit incentives to communicate prices to
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Table 7
Average levelsof (a) foregone s urplusand (b) the number of inefﬁcient rounds
Session # DAM DBAM DBAM-TC DBM
(a)1 1.48 1.77 3.54 6.31
2 0.25 0 2.02 7.83
3 1.26 1.26 3.79 9.34
4 1.77 0.76 2.02 5.30
All sessions 1.19 0.95 2.84 7.20
(b)1 3 3 5 13
21 0 51 1
33 4 71 1
44 2 5 6
All sessions 11 9 22 41
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offers from their rivals. This will show whether traders (sellers) have a weak or
indeed a strong preference for not informing their competitors. Furthermore, if
sellers chose to inform each other, we can study the effect of price communication on
pricesand efﬁciency.
5.1. Treatment 5: Directed bid–ask market with subsidized price communication
(DBAM-PC)
In treatment 5 (DBAM-PC), just as in treatment 4 (DBAM-TC), buyers bear
transaction costs of 0.25 points for each trader (buyer or seller) they choose to
inform of an offer. Furthermore, a seller incurs a ﬁxed cost of 0.02 points for each
competitor she does not inform of an offer. The options to conceal or reveal price
quotes are identical to those in treatment 4, only the direct costs of doing so are
different. For example, a price quote can be concealed from all ﬁve competitorsat
zero costs in treatment 4, whereas doing so entails a cost of 0.1 points ð5   0:02Þ in
treatment 5.
The directed bid–ask market with transaction costs (DBAM-TC) now serves
as a baseline treatment to measure the preferences of sellers to conceal offers, and
to study the effects of price communication (for an overview of all treatments see
Table 1).
5.2. Expected results for the DBAM-PC
The results of the endogenous market with subsidized price communication will
show whether traders (sellers) have a weak or indeed a strong preference for not
informing their competitors. What are the possible gains of sellers when they choose
to inform each other?
First, sellers would avoid the costs for concealing offers from competitors. Second,
we have seen that the DBAM-TC treatment led to inefﬁciencies, presumably because
the active market side (the sellers) did not receive enough information. If sellers
would choose to always inform each other, then the resulting institution would
resemble an offer auction. In an offer auction only sellers make asks. These asks
apply to all buyersand every trader isinformed about all as ksand about every
acceptance of an ask. From a previous study (Walker and Williams, 1988) we know
that an offer auction exhibitsthe s ame propertiesasthe DAM. Therefore, price
communication among competitorsmight indeed lead to higher efﬁcienciesand
sellers may be able to claim part of this surplus.
Third, price communication may raise prices. Remember that in our market
(Fig. 1) the competitive quantity is4 and the equilibrium price range is[30,35]. At a
market price of 35, the joint proﬁt of sellers is 70 (and buyers’ proﬁts are 40), which is
a considerable improvement over the joint proﬁts of 50, which they attain at a price
of 30 (where buyers’ proﬁts will be 60). Therefore, more information among
competitorsmight lead to a higher average trans action price than the one (31.5)
achieved in the treatment without a price communication subsidy (DBAM-TC).
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Result 6: Communication. Most sellers strictly prefer to conceal their offers from
rivals.
In a majority of the cases (59.6% averaged across sessions) sellers do not inform
any competitor even if this secrecy is costly. In the remaining cases at least one rival
is informed about the offer. In those cases, typically all rivalsare informed (averaged
across sessions we have Dcomp ¼ 1 for 38.4% of the asks). The average dissemination
of offers is higher in the endogenous market with subsidized price communication
(DBAM-PC) than in that with transaction costs (DBAM-TC), but at Dcomp ¼ 0:377
it is still far below unity. Many sellers are willing to pay for secrecy. There is no
tendency for Dcomp to change much over time.
Ascan be s een in Table 8, there is quite some heterogeneity across sessions.
Whereas in session 2 almost all sellers opted to conceal prices, in DBAM-PC4 sellers
quite often chose to inform each other.
Result 7: The effects of prices communication. Price communication between sellers has
a small positive effect on transaction prices.
Table 9 presents average transaction prices for the different sessions and
treatments. It appears that average prices are higher in the DBAM-PC treatment,
(32.6) than in DBAM-TC treatment (31.5). The difference is small and insigniﬁcant
(p=0.11) with a two-tailed Mann–Whitney test and the 8 session averages as
observations. However, if we restrict attention to the ﬁrst 12 rounds, average prices
in treatment DBAM-TC are persistently below those in treatment DBAM-PC, and
the difference iss igniﬁcant ( p=0.028). Hence, aslong s ellersascannot rely too much
on the experiences from past rounds, increased price communication between sellers
hasan upward effect on trans action prices .
Since there isa lot of heterogeneity on the amount of price communication acros s
sessions, we analyze the relation between sellers’ communication and transaction
pricesin the DBAM-PC treatment at a more dis aggregate level. For each round we
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Table 8
Dissemination of ask prices among sellers
Session # Average value of Dcomp % offerswith Dcomp ¼ 0
DBAM-TC DBAM-PC DBAM-TC DBAM-PC
1 0.117 0.394 85.4 58.0
2 0.042 0.016 95.2 97.8
3 0.074 0.466 89.5 47.4
4 0.122 0.632 85.8 35.3
Average 0.089 0.377 89.0 59.6
Note: Averages and percentages are taken ﬁrst over the offers within a round and then over the rounds.
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as unaccepted asks). This gives us a measure for the general level of sellers’
price communication in a round. We compare thisto the corres ponding ave-
rage value of the transaction prices in the round. Across all rounds and sessions,
the Pearson correlation between these two values is signiﬁcantly positive:
rp ¼ 0:44 ðn ¼ 72; po0:01Þ.
The impact of price communication may arise from the fact that offers, which
were concealed from rivals ðDcomp ¼ 0Þ, were signiﬁcantly lower (p=0.066) than
offers that were revealed to at least one other seller ðDcomp40Þ.
11
In sum, we ﬁnd that increased price communication between sellers increases
transaction prices. The effect is statistically signiﬁcant only in the early rounds and
moderate in absolute terms. In particular, average prices typically stay within the
range deﬁned by the competitive equilibrium.
We have seen that sellers display a preference to conceal price quotes (Result 6).
Furthermore, Result 7 indicates that sellers beneﬁt collectively from revealing price
quotes. The next result shows that revealing price quotes has a public goods
characteristic.
Result 8. It is individually rational to conceal price offers from competitors.
For each session in the DBAM-PC treatment, Table 10 reportsthe average price
of accepted asks. A distinction is made between accepted asks concealed from rivals
ðDcomp ¼ 0Þ and accepted asks revealed to at least one rival ðDcomp40Þ. We ﬁnd the
accepted asks with Dcomp ¼ 0 have an average price of 33.7 and those with Dcomp40
have an average price of 33.3.
12 Although the difference iss mall, it iss igniﬁcant at a
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Table 9
Mean and standard deviation of transaction prices in the Directed Bid–Ask Market with Transaction
Costs (DBAM-TC) and with Price Communication (DBAM-PC).
Session # Mean price Standard deviation
DBAM-TC DBAM-PC DBAM-TC DBAM-PC
1 32.6 33.4 2.30 3.43
2 31.8 31.4 2.87 3.58
3 31.1 32.8 4.99 3.70
4 30.3 33.0 4.26 2.56
Average 31.5 32.6 3.60 3.32
Note: Means and standard deviations of prices are taken ﬁrst over the offers within a round and then
averaged over the rounds.
11The average price of offerswith Dcomp40 was42.2, compared to 38.3 for Dcomp ¼ 0.
12Of all accepted asks in the DBAM-TC treatment, those with Dcomp40 have an average price of 30.9
and those with Dcomp ¼ 0 an average price of 32.1. There are however only 9 accepted asks with Dcomp40
versus 180 with Dcomp ¼ 0. Therefore, the table focuses on the sessions of the DBAM-PC treatment.
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warrant the ﬁne of concealment ð0:1 ¼ 5 rivals   0:02Þ if no more than four price
quotesare made before acceptance (the average number of quotesper s eller per
round is1.6).
These data suggest that concealing price quotes from rivals is indeed the
individually rational thing to do. Even though sellers beneﬁt collectively from price
sharing, an individual seller has little interest to reveal its prices to competitors. By
revealing price quotesto competitors , a s eller ismore prone to being undercut by a
rival seller. Concealed offers can carry a higher price than revealed offers.
We now explore the effectsof price communication on efﬁciency.
13
Result 9. Low levels of price communication did not signiﬁcantly improve market
efﬁciency, compared to the treatment without subsidized price communication.
Table 11 indicatesthat the average level of efﬁciency ishigher in treatment
DBAM-PC than in treatment DBAM-TC, though not ashigh asin treatment
DBAM. None of the differences are statistically signiﬁcant, however. In DBAM-PC
sessions 1–3, the sessions with low levels of price communication, the efﬁciency was
as low as in treatment DBAM-TC. Only session DBAM-PC4, in which sellers
informed each other of about 65% of the offers, showed a higher level of efﬁciency,
comparable to the efﬁciency in treatment DBAM.
The results of the market with subsidized price communication suggest that many
traders do not just have a weak, but a strong preference to conceal information from
their competitors. At the same time, if traders would manage to disclose information
to competitorsthey could beneﬁt collectively. Price communication among
competitors is thus characterized by public good features. Even though sellers




Average price for concealed and revealed accepted offers






Note: p ¼ 0:08 Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test ðn ¼ 3Þ.
13We note furthermore that price communication had no effect on price dispersion or on the speed of
convergence. This should not be surprising since prices in the DBAM-TC treatment were already quite
close to equilibrium prices, and neither farther from equilibrium than in the DBAM treatment, nor closer
to equilibrium than in the DBM treatment.
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To investigate the forces that shape market institutions we conducted experiments
in which the information and matching process was endogenized. In our baseline
design the resulting institution can be best characterized as a ‘sealed offer double
auction market’ as traders typically chose to conceal offers from their competitors.
This institution provides less information to traders than the double auction market
(in which traders learn about all offers and all transaction prices). Nevertheless, the
sealed offer double auction market mimicked the double auction market in terms of
efﬁciency and convergence to market clearing prices. In contrast, in a decentralized
bargaining market, in which each trader isonly allowed to communicate with one
potential trading partner at a time, pricesconverged more s lowly and efﬁciency
waslower.
When imposing one-sided transaction costs on the buyers, the sellers made most
of the offers. This shows that even small transaction costs can shape the match-
ing and information structure of markets. The preference of sellers to conceal their
offers resulted in a sealed offer auction market which led to inefﬁcient trading
outcomes.
When sellers had to bear small costs to hide information from competitors, many
sellers were willing to incur these costs. Providing information to competitors has
featuresof a public good. Collectively the s ellerswould proﬁt, by maintaining higher
prices, though individually each seller has an incentive to keep her prices secret.
In the present paper we have focussed on a basic environment with a homogenous
good, one unit per trader, and stationary aggregate demand and supply. Future
work can examine the market institution that emerges in more complex
environments. For example, it would be interesting to see whether the presence of
market power will affect the incentives of sellers to communicate price offers. Also, it
would be interesting to examine whether the positive effect of seller communication
on pricesthat we found only in the earlier periodsof our s tationary environment,
will persist for longer if there are random shocks to supply and demand. More
generally, by varying the characteristics of the market environment we can get a
better understanding of the forces that shape the market institution and of the




Foregone surplus (in % of total surplus)
Session # DBAM DBAM-PC DBAM-TC
1 1.77 2.8 3.54
2 0 2 2.02
3 1.26 3 3.79
4 0.76 0.3 2.02
All sessions 0.95 2.02 2.84
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Appendix
Thisappendix containsthe ins tructionsfor the DBAM-TC treatment. For the
treatmentsDAM, DBM, DBAM and DBAM-PC we adapted the ins tructions
accordingly.
Instructions
Today we are going to set up a market in which some of you will be buyers and
others will be sellers. Those of you who have drawn a ‘‘B’’ are buyers, those of you
with an ‘‘S’’ are sellers. During the experiment you will have to make trading
decisions and these decisions will determine your earnings. During the experiment
your earningswill be denoted in points . For each point you earn you will get 30 cents
for your participation. Your earningswill be paid to you privately and in cas h after
the experiment.
First, we will go through the instructions together. After that you will get the
opportunity to study the instructions in your own pace and to ask questions.
Also we will have a practice round before we start the experiment. If you want to
make notes you can use the empty sheet that is on your table. Please, do not write on
the instructions, and do not touch the keyboard until we are done with the
instructions.
The experiment will consist of 18 trading rounds. In each trading round each
buyer may buy at most one unit. Each seller may sell at most one unit. Trades are
made in accordance with certain rulesthat will be explained below. If a buyer buysa
unit in a round, her gross-earnings are equal to the resale-value of the unit to her
minus the price she pays for the unit. If a buyer does not buy a unit, her gross-
earnings for that round are zero. If a seller sells a unit in a round, his gross-earnings
are equal to the price he receivesfor the unit minusthe cost-value of the unit to the
seller. If a seller does not sell a unit, his gross-earnings for that round are zero.
Resale-values as well as cost-values are strictly private information, no other
participant than the concerning buyer or seller, respectively, will learn about it.
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net-earnings in a round are equal to your gross-earnings minus the cost you made by
sending offers to other traders. How these latter costs are determined will be
explained below. Finally, your total earningsfor the experiment are equal to the s um
of your net-earningsin each of the 18 rounds .
Computer screen
The trading of unitswill take place by meansof the computer. All relevant
information will be available on your computer screen. You can now see what the
screen will look like during the experiment.
In the top left of the screen you can see how many points you have earned up to
that moment. Also the number of the present round is indicated. Below that you see
how much time isleft for trading in that round. For each of the 18 roundsthe total
time for trading is3 minutes .
In the middle of the screen you will see a list of the relevant ask and bid-prices. An
ask-price indicates the price at which a seller is prepared to sell, and a bid-price
indicatesthe price at which a buyer isprepared to buy. As k- and bid-priceswill be
explained in more detail below.
On the right-hand side of the screen your value is indicated. If you are a
buyer, the resale-value of a unit in that round isindicated. If you are a s eller, the
cost-value of a unit in that round isindicated. Res ale-valuesmay be different for
different buyers, and cost-values may be different for different sellers. Also your
value may change from round to round. But every buyer gets the same resale-
values the same number of rounds, and every seller gets the same cost-values the
same number of rounds.
14 Also you can see where your gross-earnings will be
indicated, and that your net-earningsfor the round will be equal to your
grossearnings minus the cost you have made in sending offers (as will be explained
below).
In the middle left of the screen you see whether you are a buyer or a seller. Here
also your ID-letter is indicated. The IDs for the buyers are A, B, C, D, E and F. The
IDsfor the s ellersare U, V, W, X, Y and Z. Your ID will randomly change from
round to round. Furthermore, IDs are not related to the cost- or resale-values.
Hence, the IDs are for registration purposes only and do not convey information
about the identity of participantsor about their values .
In the bottom right of the screen you see a box called last action. This box
mentionsthe las t action that isrelevant to you.
Finally, at the bottom of the screen you see a long ﬂat row. In this row you
are informed about all accepted asks and bids that were in your column of ask- and
bid-prices.
Now we will ﬁrst go through the speciﬁc instructions for buyers, and than through
the speciﬁc instructions for sellers. On your handout you will only ﬁnd the speciﬁc
instructions that concern your role in the market.
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After the determination of the valuesand the IDs , the market opensfor trading. If
you want to buy a unit, and you have not yet bought a unit in that round, then you
can do two things:
(1) You can press B to make a bid and to enter a price at which you are prepared
to buy a unit. After you press B you are requested to enter a bid-price. This bid-price
must be above or equal to zero and below or equal to your resale-value. After you
have entered your bid-price, you must decide to which sellers you want to send your
bid and which of the other buyersyou want to inform about your bid. You may send
your bid to any number of sellers, but at least to one seller. You may inform any of the
other buyers about your bid, but you are not obliged to do so. Therefore, after you
entered your bid-price, you are also requested to enter the ID(s) of at least one seller
to whom you want to send this bid and of any of the other buyers you want to
inform. Hence, you may enter asmany of the s eller ID-letters(U, V, W, X, Y, Z) and
buyer ID-letters (A, B, C, D, E, F) as you want, but you should at least enter one
seller ID-letter. Recall that the IDs change from round to round. After you have
entered the ID(s), your bid-price will appear in the lower middle of your screen in the
column ‘‘bids’’ and it is marked with an asterix (*). Now your bid-price is
transmitted to the sellers and buyers you have entered, and will appear in their
columnsof bid-pricestogether with your ID.
By sending your bid to a seller or another buyer you incur a cost. To be precise, for
each of the other traders(s eller or buyer) that you decide to inform about your bid,
you incur a ﬁxed cost of 0.25 points. The total cost you incur by sending bids to
other traders will be subtracted from your gross-earnings to determine your net-
earningsfor the round.
A seller who receives your bid may accept it or not. The buyers you selected can of
course not accept your bid—they are only informed about it. As soon as one of the
sellers accepts your bid, you will get a message in the lower-right corner of your
screen under ‘‘last action’’, and the corresponding earnings will be calculated and
indicated on your screen under ‘‘value’’. Also all other sellers and buyers you have
chosen to send your bid to will learn that your bid is accepted. Your bid-price will
vanish from their column ‘‘bids’’ and will appear in the row at the bottom of their
screens.
If your bid is not accepted by a seller, you will not get a message. Notice that it is
possible that you send a bid to a seller who has already sold a unit to another buyer.
Hence, receiving no message may mean that the sellers you selected to send your
bid to have not yet decided about your bid, that they reject it, or that they already
sold a unit.
Aslong asyou have not bought a unit in the trading round you may alwaysrevis e
your bid by just pressing ‘‘B’’, entering a (possibly new) price, and entering (possibly
new) sellers’ and buyers’ IDs. If you enter a new bid, your old bid will disappear. By
making a new bid you again incur a ﬁxed cost for each of the other traders that you
decide to inform about your new bid. However, you are not forced to make any
(new) bid. Like buyers can make bids, sellers can make asks. Thisbringsusto the
second thing you can do to buy a unit.
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that is indicated in the column ‘‘asks’’ in the upper-middle of your screen. Of
course, you cannot use this option if this column is empty. If an ask-price is indicated
in thiscolumn, then one of the s ellers(indicated by hisID-letter) isprepared to
sell a unit to you at the indicated price. If you decide to accept this ask-price you
simply press K. Since there may be more than one ask-price in the column, you
also need to enter the seller-ID of the ask you wish to accept. Then the trade is
conducted, your earningsare regis tered, and all buyersand s ellerswho were
informed about this ask can see at the bottom of their screen that a trade has
occurred at thisprice.
Speciﬁc instructions for sellers
After the determination of the valuesand the IDs , the market opensfor trading.
If you want to sell a unit and you have not yet sold a unit in that round, you can do
two things:
(1) You can press P to make an ask and to enter a price at which you are prepared
to sell a unit. After you press P you are requested to enter an ask-price. This ask-
price must be below or equal to 100 and above or equal to your cost-value. After you
have entered your ask-price, you must decide to which buyers you want to send the
ask and which of the other sellers you want to inform about your ask. You may send
your ask to any number of buyers, but at least to one buyer. You may inform any of the
other sellers about your offer, but you are not obliged to do so. Therefore, after you
entered your ask-price, you are also requested to enter the ID(s) of at least one buyer
to whom you want to send this ask, and of any of the other sellers that you want to
inform. Hence, you may enter asmany of the buyer ID-letters(A, B, C, D, E, F) and
seller ID-letters (U, V, W, X, Y, Z) as you want, but you should at least enter one
buyer ID-letter. Recall that the IDschange from round to round. After you have
entered the ID(s), your ask-price will appear in the upper middle of your screen in
the column ‘‘asks’’ and it is marked with an asterix (*). Now your ask-price is
transmitted to the buyers and sellers you have entered, and will appear in their
columnsof as k-pricestogether with your ID.
For each of the other traders(buyer or s eller) that you decide to inform about
your ask, you incur a ﬁxed cost of zero—by sending your ask to a buyer or another
seller you does not incur any cost. Hence if you make a trade in a round, your net-
earnings for that round are equal to your gross-earnings.
A buyer who receives your ask may accept it or not. The sellers you selected can of
course not accept your ask—they are only informed about it. As soon as one of the
buyers accepts your ask, you will get a message in the lower-right corner of your
screen under ‘‘last action’’, and the corresponding earnings will be calculated and
indicated on your screen under ‘‘value’’. Also all other buyers and sellers you have
selected to send your ask to will learn that your ask is accepted. Your ask-price will
vanish from their column ‘‘asks’’ and appear in a row at the bottom of their screens.
If your ask is not accepted by a buyer, you will not get a message. Notice that it is
possible that you send an ask to a buyer who has already bought a unit from another
seller. Hence, receiving no message may mean that the buyers you selected to send
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already bought a unit.
Aslong asyou have not s old a unit in the trading round you may always
revise you ask by just pressing ‘‘P’’, entering a (possibly new) price, and entering
(possibly new) buyers’ and sellers’ IDs. If you enter a new ask, your old ask will
disappear. However, you are not forced to enter any (new) ask. Like sellers can send
asks, buyers can make bids. This brings us to the second thing you can do to sell
a unit.
(2) You can press on V. In that case you can sell a unit at one of the bid-prices
that is indicated in the column ‘‘bids’’ in the lower middle of your screen. Of course,
you cannot us e thisoption if thiscolumn isempty. If a bid-price isindicated in
thiscolumn, then one of the buyers(indicated by her ID-letter) isprepared to buy a
unit from you at the indicated price. If you decide to accept thisbid-price you
simply press V. Since there may be more than one bid-price in the column, you also
need to enter the buyer-ID of the bid you wish to accept. Then the trade is
conducted, your earningsare regis tered, and all s ellersand buyerswho were
informed about this bid-price can see at the bottom of the screen that a trade has
occurred at thisprice.
Summary
The experiment consists of 18 trading rounds, and each round lasts 3 minutes.
You are either a buyer or a seller. In a round each buyer may try to buy one unit and
each seller may try to sell one unit. For a buyer, gross-earnings will be equal to the
resale-value of the unit minus the price paid. For a seller, gross-earnings will be equal
to the price received minusthe cos t-value of the unit. Valuesare different for
different traders, and they change from round to round. Buyers can try to buy by
making bids or by accepting asks. Sellers can try to sell by making asks or accepting
bids. Buyers’ net-earnings in a round are equal to their gross-earnings minus the cost
they made in sending bids to other traders. Each time a buyer makes a bid she incurs
a cost of 0.25 points for every seller or buyer she decides to inform about this bid.
Sellers costs from sending asks to other traders are zero. Therefore, their net-
earningsare equal their gros searning.
During the experiment all earningsare denoted in points . After the experiment,
your earnings in cash will be determined at a rate of 1 point = 30 cents. You will
receive your earningsprivately, immediately after the experiment. Your earningsare
your own business, you do not have to discuss them with anyone.
Final remarks
During the experiment, it isnot allowed to talk or communicate with other
participantsin any way (other than through the trading). If you have a ques -
tion, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to your table. If
anything strange appears on your screen, or if you think the computer is not doing
what you think it should, please notify the experimenter so he can try to ﬁx the
problem.
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